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McKay: Defense of the Old Court and a Plea for Some Certainty in the Law

DEFENSE ORTHE "OLD" COURT AND A PLEA
FOR SOME CERTAINTY IN THE LAW*
DOUGLAS MCKAY, SR.t

The article by Mr. Graydon is well written and interesting but in the, main it is wrong factually and is illogical in
its conclusions.
The two underlying purposes of his article are to minimize the necessity of the principle of stare decisis in our
system of jurisprudence and to extol the excellence of the
present Supreme Court of the United States and its superior-

ity to the Court existing prior to 1987.
Of course no thoughtful student of law and government
will subscribe to a blind adherence to the stare decisis doctrine, for, after all, in the main, the law is a growing and.
cnanging system that must be adapted to the times-to fit
the needs of living persons. If the principle of stare decisis
were an absolute one, both the legislative and judicial branches
of our triune system of Government would become hopelessly
petrified and archaic. Hence, applied to laws in general, particularly statutory enactments, the principle is unimportant.
Let us not forget, however, that under our constitutional plan
of Government, where the Executive, Legislative and Judicial
branches and their powers are clearly separated, and where
the genius of the plan demands that one shall not exercise
or infringe upon the rights of the other, lest the structure,
so wisely planned, be overbalanced and destroyed, the Courts
must preserve the fundamentals of the Constitution jealously,
through the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Let
us also not forget that it is not the prerogative of the Judicial
branch to make laws, but to interpret laws, and to determine
whether the enactments of the Legislative department or the
orders of the Executive branch conform to the requirements
of the Constitution.
Constitutional interpretations once made become fundamental, and should be adhered to and preserved, since they
*This is a draft of extemporaneous remarks made on the occasion of the presentation
If the preceding article before the Richland County Bar Association.
tMember of South Carolina Bar, firm of McKay- & McKay, Columbia, S. C.
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furnish the beacon lights to the course of the Ship of State.
These fundamentals should be made strong and clear and
should not be tampered with, blotted out, or changed unless
clearly outmoded or wrong. And, assuredly, there is no power
in the Courts, or in the Executive, or Legislative branches
to amend or abrogate constitutional provisions, which are
inviolate until changed by the will of the people by amendment in the manner provided therein.

These things being true, how can it be argued that the
principle of stare decisis as applied to Constitutional interpretations by the most powerful Court in the world is something of minor importance, and should be disregarded at the
whim of a set of philosophers and ideologists who might happen to control the Supreme Court of the United States? However, I shall refer a little later to the present situation, in
afiswer to my friend's glorification of the Court as composed
since 1937, and his disparagement by implication of the sotermed "old" Court, prior to that date.
In conclusion as to the matter of stare decisis, it is interesting to note that after the theme song of the principal paper
that al things too will change, the speaker extols the definition of John Marshall of "interstate commerce" in Gibbons
,v. Ogden,' and points out that the present Court adheres
thereto logically to support its extensions of the scope of inter-state commerce. A more impressive tribute to the stare
decisis principle cannot be found.
I have ho patience with detractions and criticisms of the
formerly great Supreme Court of the United States by those
-who are pleased to term it "the old Court", the "reactionary
Court", the "Nine Old Men", etc.; and to charge that the
record of the Court has been deterrent to the interests of
the people: Let us not forget that through the course of the
country's history, that Court has preserved the rights of minorities, and during the dark, disgraceful period of reconstruction, it was the one and only branch of the government
1. 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
2. United States v. Murray Stanley; United States v. Michael Ryan;
'United States v. Samuel Nichols; United States v. Samuel D. Singleton;
Richard A. Robinson and Sallie J. Robinson, his 'wife v. Memphis and
,Charleston Railroad Company, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
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that protected our liberties. Note the Civil Rights Cases
and others.
The contention that the Court was responsible for enslavement of American labor is mythical and fantastic. So,
also, is the general assumption that interests of capital and
labor are necessarily diametrically opposed. Such privileges
that the capitalistic system enjoyed from the end of the Confederate War to the early 1900's were opportunities that arose
in the development of the natural resources of the country, fostered and afforded by the Executive and Legislative
branches of National and State governments. The advantages
enjoyed were political and so long as they remained within
Constitutional limits, the Court was bound to uphold them.
Any lawyer knows that an executive or a legislative body
may within its powers promulgate or enact orders or statutes
that are utterly wrong or absurd from a commonsense view
that a Court is powerless to correct.
That of course was the great period of the industrial development of this country and of the discovery and utilization
of our natural resources. The capitalistic system necessarily
was riding high, and, of course, there were instances of injustice 'and ruthlessness where the rights of the little man
were trodden down. However, it cannot be truthfully contended that such was the rule and not the exception; and out
of it all came a growing and ever increasing sense of social
responsibility both in corporate and governmental spheres.
Particularly since the turn of the century have the great masters of industry and wealth begun to employ vast resources
for establishment of foundations for the uplift and betterment
of employees and of all mankind. Space forbids elaboration
on this-so, hurriedly, locally, in a small field, I call atten.tion to increasingly improved conditions for the past twentyfive years or more in the mill villages of this State; in the
large national field, note the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations. These latter, of course, are conspicuous examples,
but hundreds of others, large and small, might be cited.
One more consideration that should be noted is that during
the period from the end of the War Between the States to
1937, this country grew and developed from a third-rate
power to the greatest nation the world has ever known. We
may assume our system of government, of which the Supreme
Court is the stabilizing factor, and conditions of life that the
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system fostered are responsible for our greatness. Apply the
test of "the proof of the pudding"--and thank God-that the
plan we adopted has not only preserved to us happiness and
the blessings of liberty, but also has made us the conservators
of liberty for the rest of the earth.
Let us balance against the so-called Capitalistic era, which
so generally and thoughtlessly is denominated bad, the labor
era brought about by the half-baked, crack-pot philosophies
of the Roosevelt regime. Consider the sit-down strike, the enslavement of the individual laborer by his union, the enforced
membership or "closed-shop" principle, the jurisdictional
strike, the czaristic powers built up by a few selfish leaders
-Lewis, Petrillo, and others-which leaders in time of national peril defied the Government to the p6int of treasonl
Many other shocking excesses of this orgy of labor will occur
to all of you. Of course it would be absurd to blame this
situation on the present "New Deal" or "Roosevelt" Supreme
Court for it was brought about by legislative cringing to
a demagogic executive. However, it is not creditable to the
Court that a majority of its members, at least, have sought
through an unseemly obeisance to the Executive and Legislative will to uphold statutes such as the Wagner Act, and
to condone incidents such as culminated in the notorious
Teamster decision s . My distinguished friend holds up the
Carter Coal case 4 as an iniquitous example of the old Court's
reactionary leanings. All I ask of you is to compare it with
the Teamster's decision, and I could mention others, and you
will have to conclude that the Carter case falls within strict
constitutional limits, whereas the Teamster case violates constitutional guarantees and fundamental natural and moral
laws assuring human and property rights.
The field of interstate commerce-to which my friend
refers-has been necessarily enlarging since Chief Justice
Marshall's time with the growth and development of the country. The commerce clause of the Constitution wisely places
the control and regulation of this commerce, so essential to
3. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Stablemen and Helpers of America, et al, v. United States of America,
315 U. S. 521 (1942).
4. James Walter Carter v. Carter Coal Company, et al, 298 U. S.
238 (1935).
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the public welfare, for uniform control under the power of
the Congress. During the New Deal regime this power was
invoked aud exercised beyond all limits hitherto conceived,
in order to attempt to justify the extension of the central
or Federal power to objects hitherto subject only to State
regulation-which the New Deal ideologists deemed essential to their political success. Realizing the "Old Court" would
not demean itself to decide for political ends what practically
every recognized constitutional lawyer in the country, save
the subsidized "brain-trusters", knew was unconstitutional,
the President attempted to pack the Court. The country was
shocked, and for the first time the controlled Legislative
branch rejected the Master's mandate. Time, however, due
to the unprecedented period of occupancy of the Presidential
office by. Mr. Roosevelt, afforded him his opportunity to pack
the Court, He did. He meant to lower the Court's prestige.
He did-by appointing men, in the main, of mediocre legal
ability to what, up to that time, had been the greatest court
in the world.
The Court as now constituted is composed generally of
individuals of good mentality, but among them is a paucity of
real lawyers. There is no common foundation of legal knowledge among them, consequently the unprecedented number of
dissenting opinions. Philosophers and ideologists are individualists, generally exhibitionists, and there is no common
ground of theory or understanding. As much as such may be
worth to introduce thought provoking theories among
thinkers-or super intellectuals--their value is negligible, to
say the least, on the most all .powerful Court in existenco,
whose pronouncements are ultimate law in the intensely practical plan of a great government, whose existence is based on
liberty under law. This existence is not theoretical but is
founded on the positive guarantee of equal justice under the
Constitution to all. The "all" being made up of persons, individual, employee and employer, laborer and capitalist.
With an obvious lack of observance of the purpose of the
Constitution, so essential to the balanced structure of our Govw
eminent, the present Court follows an uncharted course, fail=
ing to recognize the constitutional beacon lights that warl
against an uncertain or wrong course. Them beacon lights
have been broad and ample in their beneficint indications of
constitutional rights; beyond their limitg li6 danger to our
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plan of Government. For example, since the opinion in Cooley
v. The Wardens5 and perhaps earlier, it has been recognized
that the commerce clause of the Constitution did not deprive
the state of the right to subject interstate commerce to reasonable police provisions within their borders, provided such
provisions were not discriminatory nor burdensome as to
commerce, and the Congress had not entered such regulatory
field. This exception is as classical as the guiding principles
laid down in Gibbons v. Ogden. Leaving this momentarily,
I revert to Mr. Graydon's reference to the new Court's Southeastern Underwriterscase 6 holding insurance to be commerce
and when conducted across state lines-interstate commerce.
For seventy-five years prior to the Southeastern Underwriters
case, insurance had been adjudicated non-commerce, and many
states, including South Carolina, had passed purposely discriminatory tax laws against foreign insurance corporations.
In the confusion created by this decision of the Court, affecting the largest business interest of the nation, the Congress
passed Public Law 15, known as The McCarran Act, which,
in substance authorized the continued effect and existence
of the various and varied state regulatory statutes. The admittedly discriminatory and burdensome South Carolina laws
were appropriately attacked as violative of the Commerce
Clause, among others, of the United States Constitution, and
the final decision upholding such laws was delivered by this
new Court."
The writer challenges any lawyer who reads this to interpret the confused reasoning of this opinion. One must conclude that the Court means that the admittedly discriminatory and burdensome imposition on interstate commerce is
neither, because the Congress by Public Act 15 allowed the
power to regulate this phase of interstate commerce to the
various wills of the different states. Mark you! I waive the
point of the Court finding the act not discriminatory; even
though the act, itself, proclaims its discriminatory purpose;
5. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, etc.,
12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
6. United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, et al, 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
7. cf Prudential Insurance Company v. L. George Benjamin, 328
U. S.408 (1946).
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I do not protest the Court finding the imposition not burdensome, though the revenue exacted amounted to approximately
$25,000 a year; but I do protest in desperation-that a finding
that the Congress can delegate to the states the power, exclusively granted to it, to tax and regulate interstate commerce is not only violative of the commerce clause, but is
subversive of the Constitution itself-giving the creature of
the Constitution power to alter and destroy the Constitution
itself.
On the same day this constitutional monstrosity was produced, and the admitted discrimination and burden were held
nonexistent, this selfsame Court in Morgan v. Virginia8 held
unconstitutional an obviously proper police regulation of the
Commonwealth of Virginia requiring-with equal accommodations-the segregation of whites and Negroes on buses,
on the ground that it constituted a burden on interstate
commerce.
These instances are noted because in the principal paper
the subject of the Commerce Clause and its enlargement was
referred to. Many others of equal inconsistency under the
Commerce Clause, under the 14th Amendment and other constitutional provisions could be cited if space permitted, to
substantiate the writer's contention that the principal writer's
position that the present Supreme Court is a more enlightened Court and is superior to the Court that existed prior to
1937, is entirely untenable.
After all, the purpose of this article is to discuss the relative merits of the present Supreme Court of the United States
and that logically brings up the comparison with what my
friend teims the "old" or "conservative" Court. Conservatism
in a tribunal such as- the Supreme Court of. the United States
is a necessary characteristic in my opinion, since it is admittedly the stop-gap or stabilizing influence in our governmental
scheme of things. However, it is beyond my comprehension
how the term "conservative" can be used to stigmatize a court,
five of whose members were Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis, Stone,
Cardozo. Consider the remaining four-Roberts, a magnificent lawyer, without a compeer on the Court as such, save,
doubtfully, Hughes and Sutherland; Van Daventer, rich in
long judicial experience; Sutherland, a profound and skilful
8. Irene Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U. S. a73 (1946).
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lawyer, with much political experience; and McReynolds, a
rock-ribbed conservative, less able than his associates, but at
least clear and unmistakable in his judicial utterances-a lost
virtue at this stage of judicial pronouncements.
All I ask is for any fair minded, thoughtful lawyer to
stack this "old" Court against what we have now, and he will
find only two of the-incumbents that will qualify with the
average of that Court: Felix Frankfurter, a scholar, though
a New Deal exhibitionist, who mellowed and sobered with his
great responsibility, with his real devotion to the law will go
down in history as a great Justice. Also Robert H. Jackson,
the only highly experienced practitioner of law on the Court;
he is forceful and determined and allows no philosophies to
lure him away from constitutional fundamentals. The leader
of the majority branch of the Court is Black. He was
Roosevelt's first appointee; and was selected as a reward for
political adherence, without possessing in advance any true
qualifications for the great office; but on the bench he has
worked tirelessly. He strives for the unique, and, apparently,
for the reputation of champion of the individual. Somewhat
incongruously, and-though a Southern Democrat whatever
that is now-his opinions are not friendly to the doctrine of
States' Rights. In general mental vigor he is the equal of
Jackson, is smart, ingenious, dangerous in his inclinations to
play fast and loose with the fundamentals, and with which
he, apparently, is unacquainted.
The late unfortunate blast of Jackson against Black was
discreditable; and it must be admitted at the present Jackson
apppears at fault because he "blasted." I predict, however,
-and it may be wishful thinking-that when the real facts
are disclosed Jackson will not only be vindicated but justified.
The great number of dissents is unfortunate, but even
more deplorable is the bitterness that many of the opinions
evidence.
The real grievance against the present Court is that with
differences among themselves, with disregard of precedent,
with failure to appreciate constitutional limitations, the mass
of opinions might be likened to a "crazy quilt." How my
friend, able lawyer that he is, can compare this Court advantageously with the "old Court" is surprising! This Court has
abandoned accepted principles of constitutional interpreta-
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fion, sets up new interpretations and sometimes within a few
months changes or overrules itself as to the matters of grave
import-with the result that I do not believe there is a lawyer in this broad land today who can with even slight certainty advise a client as to his constitutional rights. In other
words, the law of the land is beclouded in uncertainty and
obscurity. Not infrequently the difference between right and
wrong decisions as affecting the general welfare is not vital.
One of the greatest vices in any system of the law can be uncertainty. Often an individual may not agree with the law
laid down by the Court, but right or wrong, let's have a law
and kmow what it is! Otherwise there is chaos.
the present situation created by the "new" Supreme
Court of the United States brings to mind the instance that
through.centuries has been an example of tyranny and misgovernment; that of the Roman Emperor who published his
laws on tablets of brass--placed so high upon the temple walls
in the Forum that none could read or know them.
In conclusion-realizing that there is nothing perfectthat everything is subject to change-I, nevertheless, maintain that to preserve our system of Government, with its
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches operating inr
dependently and without the impingement of one upon fthe
other, it is essential that we should go back to constitutional
fundamentals-have them declared as in the past clearly and
certainly-unobscured by ideologies-in order that our way
of life and our great government may survive to insure the
existence of freedom and the blessings of liberty.
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